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Abstract
This paper intends to explore the philosophical foundation of
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics on meaning and truth. Husserl’s phenom-
enology and Heidegger’s existential phenomenology will be used
as point of reference to disentangle the complexity of Ricoeur’s
hermeneutical project. Ricoeur proposes and develops a new
hermeneutical method. He places an emphasis on “the primacy of
language” as a reference point to grasp self-understanding. Ricoeur
shifts the focus of phenomenology from “intuition” to “media-
tion”; from “essence seeking” to “symbol interpretation”. It is
equivalent to saying that in formulating his concept on self-under-
standing, Ricoeur historicizes the subject. Thus, subject is no longer
understood in its essence, but rather, on how it creates itself through
language.
INTRODUCTION
The history of modern Western philosophy, to some extent, can
be viewed as a battle of ideas concerning the search for truth. Yet there is
one point often missing in this kind of philosophical debate: that philo-
sophical activity is entirely linguistic. One may consider an idea “an idea”
when it is already articulated into language. Thinking is not so much a
mental process, or even a rational activity, but a linguistic matter. It is
language that enables us to think.1  As an Australian semiotician, Richard
Harland, proposes rhetorical question: “How could ideas exist in the mind
without words?”2  This is to say that without language, there is no think-
ing.
This linguistic issue gained its popularity in philosophical discourse
during the 20th century. This so-called linguistic turn3 marked the emer-
gence of new sensibility and radical shift toward the appreciation of the
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role of language in philosophical discourse. Language is repositioned from
an instrumental function to constitutive function. Previously it was com-
mon to understand language as merely an instrument to reflect reality.
The “linguistic turn” shed new light on language. Language is regarded
now as a constitutive element of reality. The way we understand reality
depends on the way we represent it. Reality exists as represented through
language. That is to say, our relationship with reality is not direct. It is
always mediated by language.
One prominent theorist who follows this “linguistic turn” project
is Paul Ricoeur.4  However, it is important to note that Ricoeur’s ap-
proach is quite different from structuralist approach. Structuralism for-
mulates linguistic issue with radical anti-phenomenological approach,
which considers meaning as independent from subject.5  It claims mean-
ing derives solely from a system of signs. Whereas, Ricoeur embraces a
hermeneutical-phenomenological agenda that serves self-understanding.
Ricoeur’s interpretation theory sets out from his critique of
Husserl’s more idealist mode of consciousness, through which he further
radicalizes phenomenology to hermeneutics. He criticizes Heidegger’s
phenomenological ontology, wherein meaning is conceived of as “con-
cealing” itself. Taking this lead, Ricoeur moves away interpretation to
symbolic field.6  Indeed, language plays crucial role in Ricoeur’s herme-
neutics. If hermeneutics is to be defined as a process of interpretation that
aims at self-understanding, this process will take place in and through
symbolic field, so to speak, through language.
Before commencing this discussion, a brief explanation about
Husserl and Heidegger’s phenomenological project, particularly which
gives insight to Ricoeur’s hermeneutic __ will be of much help. Ricoeur
begins to build his theory from his critique to Husserl and Heidegger’s
phenomenological project.
CRITIQUE TO HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER’S
PHENOMENOLOGY
Edmund Husserl is arguably the key figure in phenomenology tra-
dition. He introduces Transcendental Phenomenology; a new theory about
consciousness and mode of knowledge. Husserl’s main purpose is seek-
ing for eidos or the essence of knowledge. To some extent, his very at-
tempt is similar to Descartes’s investigation.7  Like Descartes’, Husserl
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phenomenological project is based upon ‘consciousness’. Consciousness
is determined as the foundation of knowledge. However, Husserl and
Descartes’s project is somewhat different. Both of them differ in how
they treat consciousness as prima causa in their philosophical founda-
tion. Descartes’ philosophy considers consciousness as introspective, that
is, as consciousness that recognizes itself. On the contrary, Husserl’s con-
sciousness is “intentional”. This means, consciousness is always conscious-
ness about something. It is always directed toward an object. In this man-
ner, Husserl attempts to break down Cartesian dichotomy between sub-
ject and object and between consciousness and reality.
Husserl’s phenomenological project might be best summarized
under the jargon “back to the thing in itself”.8  Phenomenology, then, is an
art to understand phenomena as self-manifestation of reality. Phenomena
are the reality that shows itself in consciousness. For Husserl, phenom-
enology is not only about epistemology, but also ontology. To this de-
gree, Kantian dichotomy between phenomena and noumena is collapsed.
Intentionality of consciousness, in Husserl’s view, is the reality as it ap-
pears itself in consciousness. There is no reality without consciousness.
Nevertheless, it does not refer to an idealistic standpoint which views
reality as constructed by consciousness. But rather, reality derives “an
objective world” and “genuine” knowledge is inherently inseparable from
subjective consciousness.9  In phenomenological perspective, ‘truth’ is
understood as the reality which shows itself in subjective consciousness;
the truth is discovered in “any attempt at relating the conditions of the
appearance of things to the structure of human subjectivity”.10
Therefore, understanding and authentic experience can only be
grasped through intuitive mode, by allowing the phenomenon to show
itself in consciousness without any mediation. Authenticity appears itself
directly and transparent (intuitive) to subject’s consciousness. Intuition is
kind of pure reflection which operates by directing itself toward an object
in order to grasp theoria, or true knowledge. In Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy, intuitive knowledge is conceived as “a purification of the phenom-
enological field of consciousness from its spatio-temporal objectivity”.11
Consciousness is understood as “self-contained system of being”.12
Thought may reveal being directly and in transparent way. Based on this
assumption, Husserl’s phenomenology insists that philosophy is not a
concept or interpretation of reality, but more precisely, reality in itself.13
In his second period, Husserl proposes another key concept in his
phenomenology, namely Lebenswelt or life-world. It refers to everyday
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world which is experienced and comprehended by each individual. It is
the horizon where primordial experience of individual and its daily life
transpires. It is called ‘primordial’ because this experience has not been
redefined by any scientific categories. Lebenswelt subscribes to the idea
that one’s encounter with the world is prior to any reflection to the world.
It constitutes the world we live in and experience with, where there is no
clear distinction between subject-object as suggested by science. It is prior
to our scientific distinctions of subject and object. Thus, scientific-objec-
tive understanding is nothing but the interpretation of Lebenswelt.14
HEIDEGGER’S EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Existential phenomenology is proposed and developed by
Heidegger as a critical response to Husserlian phenomenology and scien-
tific understanding in general (read: the worldview which tends to objec-
tify and instrumentalize). Heidegger’s phenomenology is existential in a
way that it is anchored on existence to explain reality, meaning, and truth.
Heidegger argues that Husserlian phenomenology of knowledge and un-
derstanding is a-historical and its concept about self is trapped into pure
transcendentalism, which he calls “immanent consciousness of truth”.15
Husserl urges one to set aside and to bracket or suspend any cultural
prejudices, whether it is in the naive or scientific forms. This is necessary
in order to gain understanding, or in this case, to be able to grasp the
essence of “things in themselves”, which is presumed to be universal and
exceeds space and time. Heidegger, on the contrary, rejects Husserl’s
notions concerning the subject and the transcendental.
Indeed, Heidegger does not begin with transcendental subject as
does Descartes or Husserl. His subject is, rather, historical, a kind of
subject that inhabits and bound to its daily life. Herein lies his difference
with his predecessor as well as tutor, Husserl. Husserl intends to tran-
scend temporality and particularity in order to grasp what he believes as
universal essence. In stark contrast to this, Heidegger situates temporal-
ity and particularity as conditions of existence which enable understand-
ing and truth. Thus, understanding is not located outside the world, due
to the very fact that subject is always already in the world (being-in-the-
world). Another interesting contrast, Husserl insists on detachment as a
key to knowledge and understanding. While, Heidegger stresses engage-
ment. Knowledge and understanding bases itself upon concern and inter-
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est. However, this is not self-interest. Interest here is a ‘horizon’ of mean-
ing for an individual. To put it differently, reflection toward the world or
reality is prior to and becomes possible due to the fact that we are part of
it and have meaningful relationship with the world and reality that we try
to represent.16  Actually, Husserl had considered this but regarded it as a
prejudice that has to be suspended.
Heidegger’s assumption becomes a crucial attack on science that
holds objectivistic-positivistic paradigm. The scientific paradigm relies
on dualism, such as dualism of subject-object and fact-value. To give an
example, in our society date of birth is considered to be the most crucial
fact of people’s biography. One’s birth date is recorded in exact manner,
which consists of date, month, and year. Yet in another society, the ques-
tion of date of birth might not be considered important. Rather than date
of birth, perhaps the day of birth is more relevant to them. It may relate,
for instance, to the belief of good or bad fortune. This instance shows
that fact is oftentimes closely related to value; both are not considered
contradictory. It cannot be fully separated from the horizon of meaning,
and the differences are not as sharp as considered by the objectivistic-
positivistic paradigm.
Heidegger’s project shares common concern with Western phi-
losophy, which investigates the deepest meaning of reality, or as Heidegger
calls it ‘Being”. But the novelty of Heidegger’s project, lies in his method.
Through phenomenology, Husserl attempts to provide the new ground of
philosophy as a rigorous science. Heidegger, instead, goes further by
questioning such an ambitious and optimistic project. Broadly speaking,
both Husserl and Heidegger agree upon basic principle of phenomenol-
ogy, which states that reality shows itself.  Yet Husserl starts from intu-
ition, while Heidegger starts from existence. If phenomenology is to be
defined as an event where the essence discloses itself, Husserl claims that
the essence discloses itself intuitively when the subject puts aside his dis-
position. In contrast to that, Heidegger argues that the essence will never
appear or disclose itself apart from its existence. To put it differently,
Husserl conceives meaning as transcendental, whereas Heidegger assumes
it as entirely existential.
Heidegger elaborates a new method concerning the meaning of
Being in order to grasp the fundamental ontology of understanding.17
Existence is the meaning of Being that conceals itself to us.18  Under-
standing the essence of Being is impossible unless we analyze the basic
existential condition that defines human (or Dasein, in Heidegger’s term).
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From Heidegger point of view, the basic condition of human is consti-
tuted by two primary facts, namely: existence and being-in-the-world.19
Through his existential analysis, Heidegger insists that human being al-
ways anchored in history, bound to its temporality, and always already
inhabits a certain cultural milieu. We cannot talk about humans apart from
the way they represent themselves and existence, which is mediated by
language. One is able to talk about him/her self, and describes his deepest
aspiration in so far as it is mediated by language. Language constitutes
the existence of human being. Besides, it determines one’s position in the
world and even the way the reality discloses itself as meaningful to an
individual. It is, so to speak, through language that Being reveals itself to
subjectivity.
Existential analysis is about how to interpret human through lan-
guage. From this point, self-understanding moves from immediacy to in-
terpretation. Understanding human cannot be direct, but rather it has to
be interpreted through the manner human existence reveals itself, that is
through language. Heidegger argues that “life is about interpretation”.
The truth, or the disclosure of Being through language, is therefore a
hermeneutical event. In this way, phenomenology becomes hermeneuti-
cal activity because it involves interpretation of the meaning of Being.
Yet, Heidegger differentiates the ontological status between Being and
Dasein. Being discloses itself within Dasein, but it does not suggest that
both of them are identical. The position of Being is ambiguous though, as
disclosure and closure. As Heidegger puts it, truth is aletheia.
RICOEUR AND PRIMACY OF LANGUAGE
Following Heidegger, Ricoeur criticizes the concept of a tran-
scendental-subject in Husserl’s phenomenology as the foundation of knowl-
edge and truth. The intentionality of consciousness is moved into a sub-
jective transparency of understanding. Therefore, Ricoeur concludes that
Husserl’s phenomenology and intuitive method tends to become a mere
idealism.20  And subjectivity and knowledge beome alienated from human
existence.
This is similar to Heidegger’s approach. Heidegger proposed an
idea of human existence as being-in-the-world.21  Through this concept,
human being is not located in a position that transcends space and time,
but on the contrary, it is viewed as already belong to particular horizon of
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meaning, a certain time and space. All this, then, implies hermeneutics of
“finitude”. Ontologically speaking, “finitude” is related to temporal di-
mension of Being. And, one representation of human finitude takes form
of historicity. The idea of historicity affects interpretation and meaning as
follows: First, subjectivity and meaning is constructed in intersubjective
relations. Second, Dasein or human existence is developed and constructed
through language in intersubjective dialogue with ‘others’. In short, be-
ing is being for others. Third, Dasein does not only disclose, but also
conceals itself. Being constitutes a horizon of meaning that disclose and
conceals itself, hence it is to be interpreted in and through language.
From the perspective of hermeneutics of finitude, Ricoeur’s exis-
tential phenomenology reveals “the expanding of subject’s horizon”
through interpretation. Besides, interpretative horizon which is widely
open to the hermeneutic existential-phenomenology, constitutes a new
understanding of language as a process of interpretation and meaning
construction. Hence, language becomes the new field for philosophical
investigation and interpretation of Being and takes place in symbolic space.
In the perspective of hermeneutic existential-phenomenology,
meaning relates to the capacity of Being in revealing the possibilities:
“Being discloses itself through existence (Dasein) which understands it-
self through its own possibilities”.22  Or, as formulated further by Richard
Kearney:
“Ricoeur emphasized the primacy of signifying inten-
tionality. This new emphasis leads him to advance a gen-
eral hermeneutics where phenomenology confronts its own
limit __ that is, where the intuition of essences ends and the
interpretation of symbols begins.”23
To sum up, human is no longer understood directly and transpar-
ently in terms of substance or essence, but through a “round about route”
mediated through the symbol. The symbolic  constitutes a field wherein
humans “create” and reveal themselves. The answer to the very question
of “What are we?” and “Who we are?” is to be pursued in and through
language.
Taking his cue from Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s
existential phenomenology, Ricoeur advances his hermeneutical project.
He concentrates mostly on the relation between existence and hermeneu-
tics which base itself on “interpretation as a mode of being”.  For Ricoeur,
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we are what we interpret to be. This idea is crucial indeed as a foundation
to interpretation, that is, the project of meaning as “manifestation” and
“projection”. If hermeneutics to be simplified as a matter of interpreta-
tion, as in phenomenology and existential phenomenology of Being, the
root and the horizon of existence, or Dasein, will become the starting
point to move into the most crucial issue in hermeneutics. The interpreta-
tion of “meaning” originates from the idea of finitude of human con-
sciousness which is always in constant tension between the past and the
future: “As Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology clearly showed, con-
sciousness is bound by a relation of belonging to past sedimentations and
future projects of meaning...”.24
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of finitude, precisely, elaborates how mean-
ing is contingent in the context of human existence. For him, the most
fundamental hermeneutical problem lies in the fact that existence pro-
vides a mode of interpretation since, “life is the bearer of meanings so
that understanding is made possible through interpretation of life”. Or, as
the following hermeneutics maxim suggests: “life interprets itself”. This
is equivalent to saying that interpretation is a mode of being. It is not one
among many instrumental activities, but rather a fundamental activity which
constitutes human existence.
To comprehend this concept, we have to analyze the relations
between ‘subject’ and ‘the world’ and how it influences our mode of un-
derstanding, as well as our interpretation. Here, world and contingency
take the role as horizon of meaning and understanding to the subject.
Being-in-the-world implies that subject always already sees the world
from certain ‘perspective’ and understanding. The world is never being as
non-meaning. The term “world” in this context has specific meaning.
Ricoeur himself formulates “the world” as “the most concrete horizon in
our existence”.25  Heideggerian concepts of temporality and “practical
world of life” are reflected in his statement: “Before objectivity, there is
the horizon of the world; before the subject of the theory of knowledge,
there is operative life”.26  The world initially exists as Lebenswelt, as a
world of meaning, long before it is objectively defined in scientific term.
In this sense, world becomes “the horizon” of all attitudes and under-
standing.
As a critique to objectivism, phenomenology introduces the term
“world horizon” to hermeneutics, which is the pre-given world that rep-
resents retrospective dimension of interpretation. The referential point of
this retrospective dimension of interpretation is Ricoeur’s critique to
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Husserl’s transcendental subject. In Husserl’s transcendental subject,
meaning and truth is conceived of as kind of self-transparence. In this
sense, the subject is assumed to have the capability to grasp the appear-
ance of essence of object intuitively with no mediation needed. Subjec-
tive consciousness constitutes the very foundation of meaning.27  But, the
idea of self-transparence and the immediacy of meaning is relativized by
Ricoeur by embracing Husserl’s idea of intersubjectivity. Meaning is no
longer immanent in subjectivity, but rather situated in intersubjectivity
and embedded into Lebenswelt. Lebenswelt, Ricoeur asserts, represents a
pre-given world that denotes “the level of experience anterior to the sub-
ject-object relation”.28  In contrast to the principle of self-transparency,
Ricoeur views the process of interpretation and meaning as indirect.  It is
indirect in a sense that it is mediated through others. Meaning originates
and develops itself through ‘the others’. The linguistic character of exis-
tential-phenomenology shows the intersubjective dimension of understand-
ing to the extent that “we are constructed by language”. It relates to the
fact that we construct our world intersubjectively through the preexisting
worlds of others. As Ricoeur puts it, the world: “... is always-already-
before and I come too late to express it”.29
Ricoeur goes on to argue that our existence is characterized by
historical horizon of language wherein language precedes our subjective
consciousness. Through language, nature transforms itself into culture,
hence a “world of meaning”. It transforms the unknown into the known.
Culture, or say “the world”, is simply an alternate name for nature (which
is articulated and intelligible). Thus, language is the most explicit mani-
festation of historicity and subjectivity. Anthropologically speaking, we
are indeed a linguistic being. Ricoeur remarks: “we belong to language
that has been shaped and formed by others before we arrive on the exis-
tential scene”.30  This is what constitutes the horizon of hermeneutical
activity.
Besides the historical horizon, language actually has another di-
mension, namely ‘transcendental’ horizon. The seeking for meaning is
encouraged by the human facticity wherein language plays a central role
as transcendental medium for interpretation. The concept of “hermeneu-
tics of finitude” will be used to describe the process of meaning construc-
tion. “Hermeneutics of finitude” implies that the understanding process is
not direct. This means, meaning does not originate from subjective con-
sciousness, it instead,  derives from “the others”, which is produced through
language. This mediation should be considered as social-historical text
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which is linguistic in nature. As a hermeneutical discourse, this idea shows
the crucial transition from pure phenomenology that starts from conscious-
ness to hermeneutics that begins with interpretation of symbols.
The aforementioned concepts have several implications. First, the
heart of understanding moves from consciousness to language. Human’s
interpretation and the process of understanding are not based on con-
sciousness, but on language. To interpret humans is not to analyze their
consciousness, but to interpret their symbolic expression. The question
about self (about what are we and who we are) is to be answered through
language. If Ortega Y. Gasset argued that human does not have any es-
sence, but history,31 the very same expression can be applied in Ricoeurian
hermeneutics; We can say that human does not have an essence, but lan-
guage. The historicity of human crystallizes itself in language. Second,
truth is neither transcendental nor universal, it is purely existential. Truth
is constructed through language, and language mediates between us and
reality. Truth, however, is not a correspondence between mind and real-
ity, but rather it constitutes our existing. Following this assumption, it
would be better to understand the truth as an ongoing process of express-
ing and transforming the self. Meaning is not waiting somewhere “out
there” to be found; it does not lie outside our articulation in language.
Indeed, millions of possible meanings can be articulated. Thus, truth and
meaning __ thanks to the intervention of language __ is the possibility as
well as the potentiality of existence.32  Interpretation is  a creative and
transformative event. It “creates itself” in and through language; mean-
ing, we transform ourselves as well during the interpretation process.
Function of Language: Re-description
In Existential-Phenomenological Hermeneutics’ perspective, lin-
guistic interpretation has its reference in the idea of the world. In the
process of interpretation, language works by  deciphering the hidden signs
of Lebenswelt or life-world and human existence. This kind of  herme-
neutics challenges the semiologist’s view which sees language as a closed
system of signs, as believed by Ferdinand de Saussure.33  More than self-
sufficient within its own linguistic structure, in this process of understand-
ing, language operates in dismantling symbolic power, and thereby it el-
evates existing situation and textual order toward new modes of exist-
ence.34  That is to say that, the distinctive function of language is to re-
describe reality at the symbolic level. Language, “as signifying milieu,
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must be referred to existence”.35  Language has a transcendental ability to
create new meanings to the given and present situations, is to re-describe
new awareness and experience that, in turn, brings new way of looking at
things.
Language, therefore, brings epistemology to ontology in two
senses. On the one hand, language brings interpretation to existence where
our consciousness reaches the world, on the other, it discloses possible
modes of being-in-the world as well. In this sense, for Ricoeur, “to inter-
pret is to understand a double meaning”,36 namely to move beyond exist-
ing reality (disclosure of meaning), which is symbolic, but without losing
the reference. The Heidegerrian idea that ‘Being discloses itself’ could
not be placed in the immediacy of self-reflection but within and through
linguistic mediation.37  The basic nature of language is to say about some-
thing.
The deeper layers of meaning are then deciphered by language.38
The profound and distinctive function of language to ‘disclose’ reality is
actually not weakened by non-immediacy in constructing meaning:
“…Language itself (in some sense almost intersubjective consensus) of-
fers a more valid claim to constitute the bedrock uncovered by meta-
critical exploration than ‘methods’ or ‘explanations’ which operate at a
higher or more derivative level of abstraction”.39  The intersubjective na-
ture of language discloses ‘true knowledge’.40  Also it demonstrates the
‘meta-critical exploration’ aspect of language, which highlights the imagi-
native and creative power of language which is overlooked in scientific
abstraction. Through the analyses of metaphor and narrative, Ricoeur
sees a ‘higher’ derivative level of linguistic capacity; language has ability
to bring new possibilities for imagination and vision. In other words, lan-
guage leads the openness of consciousness to new understandings of hu-
man life and the world.41  Indeed, metaphor presents a possibility rather
than actuality.42  In such a way, metaphor provid ‘imaginative discourse’
which can “open new understanding more directly rather than  descrip-
tive and scientific statements”.43
Besides, from the phenomenology of imagination, Ricoeur recon-
siders the living vitality of symbolic power of language.  He observes that
language articulates meaning not merely as an abstract mimesis of events
in reality. Meaning is more than a ‘concept’, that is, “meaning is not event
to be abstracted”.44  To see the symbolic-interpretive power of language,
Ricoeur points to ‘poetic language’. Metaphoric language works through
poetic images. The poetic image contains insights that stimulate the ways
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of becoming which are different than the ways of existing. The process of
becoming in poetic imagination gives a potential for verbal expressions.
Then, the verbal expressions exercise specific function to provide imagi-
native ‘catalyst’ for a ‘becoming’, namely becoming of our being in our
mind. However, what is distinctive here is that language has also a capac-
ity to correlate “verbal potentiality and non-verbal actuality”,45 words
and act. It is parallel with linguistic ability to break the rigid relations
between words and the world. In other words, it presents an imperative
description that is even beyond the description of ‘seeing as’, beyond
what realized as it is. This is because poetic language follows the path of
the ‘reverberation’ of the poetic image into the depths of existence”.46  To
understand this more clearly we can look to the formulation of Richard
Kearney: “The poetic image thus points to the very ‘depths of existence’
where ‘a new being in language’ is synonymous with ‘a growth in being’
itself. It is because “there is poetical imagination that words dream be-
ing”.47  Thus, in this sense, it is possible for language to incorporate pro-
ductive connection between words and our being, imagination and the
possibilities of transformation.
This linguistic vision of reality opens in us the possibilities to seek
new possibilities in our being through the creative process of poetic imagi-
nation. It demonstrates that ‘becoming in language’ could  also be be-
coming in the sense of ‘making possible’ in our mind. This shows the
capacity of language to express us by making us what it expresses. Here
“expression creates being”.48  In such dialectical expression, language
brings us to the depth of reality along with the growth of our own being.
In the process of re-creation by language, “we discover reality itself in the
process of being created”.49  So, language serves as a creative instrument
to interpret meanings from the texts of life in the process of becoming in
existence. As Ricoeur puts it: “Language in the making celebrates reality
in the making”.50  It is in this sense that we can transform the world first as
‘ideality’ under poetic imagination, and then it leads us into the symbolic
‘increase’ of becoming in our being in the world.
One of Heidegger’s key philosophical concepts was that language
is the “house of Being”. Language is the only way to understand our
being and existence. Inspired by Heidegger, Ricoeur believed that the
distinctive function of language is to disclose Being by re-describing re-
ality in new ways51 as a ‘potentiality-for-Being’.52  Yet for Ricoeur,
Heidegger’s ideas of ‘state-of-mind’, ‘Being-attuned’ and ‘mood’ in sub-
jectivity are not merely ‘subjective’, but rather, considered as ontology,53
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namely, as a certain way of existing, of becoming. The centrality of lan-
guage can be seen here in that a becoming in language takes place first in
such ontological reflection before becoming in being.  Consequently, the
human world is a creative construction of language. The words become
the world. Therefore, the function of language can also be explained in
Aristotelian term: to “present a creative poeiesis (making)”.54
In the perspective of hermeneutics, language provokes the aware-
ness of our being and reality ‘in the making’, and this represents our
modes of being. As a result, the re-description of reality by language
signalizes a ‘reconstructive power’ of human understanding and action
(praxis) in the world as well.55  For Ricoeur, linguistics constitutes a key
tool for hermeneutics, especially in correlation to textual model of inter-
pretation. The nature of language, therefore, can not be portrayed simply
as a 'picture of reality’ as proposed by Wittgenstein where the only valid
language is the ‘positive language’ representing its objective correspon-
dence with reality.56
CONCLUSION
The shift from “consciousness” to “language” marks the shift of
phenomenology to hermeneutics. In Ricoeur’s hermeneutical stance, lan-
guage plays a significant part in constructing meaning and self-under-
standing. Through the primacy of language, key issues in modern West-
ern philosophy, such as subject and truth, are redefined. By insistence on
language, the firm position of transcendental subject with its self-trans-
parency is indeed historicized through language. Concrete subject is not
the transcendental subject that transcends space and time, but rather, as a
historical subject that expresses itself in and through language. And to
talk about truth: truth is no longer ‘an equation’ between mind and real-
ity, but rather, it is the process of expressing and transforming the self.
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